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RESUMEN 
En este artículo examino críticamente el libro de Sartorio Causation and free will. Sar-
torio ofrece una detallada defensa de una concepción de secuencia real de la libertad, que 
presta una minuciosa atención a cuestiones de filosofía de la causalidad y su relación con 
la libertad. Lo que defiendo es que, aunque poner el foco en la causalidad es iluminador, 
el proyecto de Sartorio se enfrenta a serios problemas. Quizás el más preocupante de to-
dos ellos es si la explicación sensible a razones y basada en el agente propuesta por Sarto-
rio es consistente con los casos tipo Frankfurt; es decir, los casos que se proponen como 
la única razón para defender una concepción de secuencia real de la libertad. Asimismo, 
sugiero que, dado que habilidades y causalidad están tan íntimamente relacionadas, se 
desdibuja el debate si se las concibe como rivales. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I take a critical look at Sartorio’s book Causation and Free Will (2016). 
Sartorio offers a rich defence of an actual-sequence view of freedom, which pays close 
attention to issues in the philosophy of causation and how they relate to freedom. I argue 
that although this focus on causation is illuminating, Sartorio’s project nevertheless runs 
into some serious difficulties. Perhaps most worrying amongst them is whether the 
agent-based reason-sensitivity account, offered by Sartorio, is consistent with Frankfurt-
style cases – the very cases which are provided as the sole reason to endorse an actual-
sequence view of freedom. I suggest that given that powers and causation are so inti-
mately bound together, the debate is skewed somewhat by thinking of these as rivals. 
 
KEYWORDS: Freedom, Causation, Abilities. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sartorio’s book, Causation and Free Will (2016), has a bold and ele-
gant ambition: that of showing that the grounds of freedom rest entirely 
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in the actual causal history of the action. At its core, lies a defence of this 
supervenience claim:  
 
(S) An agent’s freedom with respect to X supervenes on those elements of 
the sequence issuing in X that ground the agent’s freedom [p. 29]. 
 
where this supervenience claim is understood as a proxy for the more 
difficult to analyse relation of grounding.  
Sartorio’s dismissal of a freedom that requires that we have options 
to act and refrain from acting is brief. Drawing on Frankfurt’s seminal 
paper (1969), she argues that (S) is motivated by our reaction to Frank-
furt-style cases (FSCs): namely, the thought that Frank is free to kill Furt, 
despite the inactive presence of the neuroscientist’s device ensuring that 
Frank had no option but to kill Furt. At this point, many philosophers 
will be getting off the boat, but, given Sartorio’s aims, it seems justifiable 
to side-line this issue to make headway on the best formulation of source 
compatibilism. Moreover, Sartorio’s focus on capturing the intuitive ap-
peal of FSCs, which is taken to be the claim that ‘(ACS) all that matters 
to the freedom of an act is how the agent came to perform that act, or 
the actual history of that act’ [p. 18], is impressive. By using tools and 
philosophical claims from the philosophy of causation, she crafts an 
original position which promises to improve upon other major source 
compatibilist positions.  
Sartorio’s book is rich with ideas and argument and so a short dis-
cussion piece such as this will fail to offer a comprehensive coverage of 
the issues. Instead, I shall focus on three areas which I think illustrate 
that the project, as developed by Sartorio, runs into some difficulties.  
 
 
II: THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DEBATE 
 
In chapter one, Sartorio provides the framework for the debate by 
offering a characterisation of the views she aims to defend and deny. Sar-
torio proposes to defend this thesis: 
 
The Actual-sequences Answer [ASA]: When agents are free, their freedom 
is grounded only in facts pertaining to the actual processes or sequences 
of events issuing in their behaviour [p. 9]. 
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ASA is contrasted with the alternative-possibilities answer, a thesis which 
Sartorio wishes to reject, 
 
The alternatives-possibilities answer [AP]: When agents are free, their 
freedom is grounded, at least partly, in the fact that they are able to do 
otherwise [p. 9].  
 
Sartorio presents ASA and AP as two opposing views, arguing that, 
 
Alternative-possibilities views assign a central role to certain kinds of facts 
that are not typically thought to pertain to actual sequences. In contrast, 
actual-sequence views assign no such role to facts of that kind; according 
to the actual-sequence views, facts pertaining to actual sequences do all 
the work grounding freedom [p. 11]. 
 
Proponents of AP, however, have reason to dispute this characterisation. 
Abilities to do otherwise are commonly thought of as grounded, in large 
part, in the intrinsic properties of agents plus facts about their circum-
stances.1 So, there seems no reason to claim that special significance is 
given to facts that aren’t typically thought to pertain to the actual se-
quences. Although the truth conditions of ability claims standardly ap-
peal to possible worlds, that doesn’t mean that these claims aren’t made 
true by facts about the causal history of the action including, most im-
portantly, the agent themselves. What abilities the agent has, understood as 
local properties of the agent, are precisely what AP views are interested in. 
To illustrate, imagine that John saw a child drowning but made no 
attempt to rescue her. Whether or not he has the ability to do otherwise 
depends largely on his intrinsic properties: does he have the physical 
constitution such that he can swim in waters such as these? Does his 
mental life display any debilitating phobia of water, children, etc. which 
might rob him of the ability to decide to jump in? Granted, then, the rea-
sonable assumption that the abilities of agents are largely grounded in an 
agent’s intrinsic constitution, changes to the actual sequence will typically 
occur when those abilities alter.2 So facts about agent’s abilities will be 
highly relevant to the constitution of actual sequences. 
Why does this matter? Sartorio claims that ‘(N) The freedom of 
agents is not grounded in anything other than actual sequences’ [p. 18] 
suffices to mark the contrast between ASA and AP, but this contrast is 
insufficient. On ASA, no less than AP, appeal will be made to the laws of 
nature which are arguably not intrinsic to the actual sequences. And until 
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we have a firm grasp of what constitutes these actual sequences — what 
circumstances surrounding the agent can legitimately be included for in-
stance (see footnote 2) — it will be unclear whether or not this marks a 
significant divide. By arguing that facts concerning what someone can 
and cannot do are grounded in the actual causal history of the action, (N) 
can be maintained by AP.  
This lack of a clear contrast has two ramifications. First, Sartorio 
claims that ASA, (N) and related (S), are motivated primarily by FSCs. 
But if, as I have suggested, an AP can accommodate (N) and (S), then 
that should not be thought of as the lesson of FSCs. This is not the ob-
vious conclusion to draw, rather it is the much simpler one that abilities 
to do otherwise are not necessary for moral responsibility. This conclu-
sion, not its failure to capture (N), is why FSCs cause so much trouble 
for AP. Second, (N), I submit, sounds rather plausible. It seems odd to 
think that what is going on in alternative possible worlds plays a key role 
in grounding facts about our freedom. But this interpretation of AP is 
uncharitable. If we see the abilities of agents as grounded in facts on the 
ground, so to speak, then they will affect the actual sequences of our ac-
tions. So (N) could be claimed by both Sartorio and her opponents.  
 
 
III. THE DIFFERENCE-MAKING PRINCIPLE 
 
In chapter two, Sartorio discusses a number of apparent counterex-
amples to the core supervenience thesis (S). Consider, for instance, this 
pair of cases [pp. 56-7]:  
 
Not All Roads Lead to Rome (NARR): Ryder is riding a runa-
way horse. He can’t get the horse to stop, but he can steer him in 
different directions. When Ryder approaches a cross-road he realis-
es that only one road leads to Rome. He steers his horse in this di-
rection because he hates Romans and wants them to be hurt by his 
runaway horse. Sure enough, Romans are hurt. 
 
All Roads Lead to Rome (ARR): Everything is the same as it is 
in NARR except for, unbeknownst to Ryder, he is wrong, all roads 
lead to Rome.3 
 
This pair of cases poses a threat to (S), since it seems that the causal his-
tory of Ryder’s action in the two cases is identical. In each case, he de-
Causation and the Grounds for Freedom                                                       65 
teorema XXXVII/1, 2018, pp. 61-76 
cides to steer his horse in a particular direction for, what we can assume 
are, identical reasons. But in ARR, intuitively, he doesn’t freely hurt the 
Romans in his path, whereas in NARR he does. So, Ryder’s freedom is 
not just grounded in facts about the causal history of the act. Something 
extrinsic to that causal history, namely the fact that not/all roads lead to 
Rome, is grounding Ryder’s freedom in this case. 
An AP proponent might be tempted to say that the difference con-
cerns Ryder’s abilities: in NARR, unlike ARR, Ryder was able to avoid 
hurting the Romans and this grounds the difference in freedom. An ASA 
proponent is precluded from saying this, but Sartorio provides an ingen-
ious solution. By appealing to the extrinsicness of causation, she argues 
that there is a difference in causal histories here: 
 
Extrinsicness: A causal relation between C and E may obtain, in part, owing 
to factors that are extrinsic to the causal process linking C and E [p. 71]. 
 
In ARR, there is no causal relation between Ryder’s steering the horse in 
a particular direction and his hurting Romans. Why? Well if he had tried 
to steer the horse away from the Romans, then he still would have hurt 
Romans. So, his hurting Romans is not counterfactually dependent upon 
his steering the horse in any particular direction. The same is not true in 
the case of NARR. Here, if he had steered the horse in a particular direc-
tion, then Romans wouldn’t have been hurt. There is the right relation of 
counterfactual dependence between the two events and so, plausibly, 
there is a relation of causation between them.  
I am tempted by Sartorio’s analysis of this case and think it is help-
ful to liken it to switching cases in causation. In other work [Whittle, 
(forthcoming)] I argue for the similar claim that if A is morally responsi-
ble for e then e is either an act or omission of A’s or is a causal conse-
quence of an act or omission for which A is morally responsible. So, in 
ARR, Ryder is not morally responsible for hurting Romans, only for fail-
ing to try to not hurt Romans. However, again, I don’t think there need 
be a significant divide here between AP and ASA. The former can argue 
that because Ryder lacked the ability to keep Romans safe from harm, 
his steering his horse in a particular direction was not a manifestation of 
any ability he had to keep Romans safe. So, he could not be the cause. 
Whereas in NARR, Ryder failed to manifest an ability that he had to pro-
tect the Romans, and this is precisely why we think that Ryder is morally 
responsible for this consequence. 
We can give this suggestion a little more flesh by linking it to the 
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causal modelling framework in the philosophy of causation. On this 
view, causes are relativized to causal models, where these causal models 
display our conceptualization of the particular situation in which the 
causal claim is made.4 What variables are taken to be part of that model 
largely depend upon what possibilities are taken ‘seriously’. So, to borrow 
an example of McDermott (1995), p. 525, suppose we have a fielder 
catching a cricket ball. Between the fielder and the window stands a high 
wall. Does the fielder prevent the ball from hitting the window? Intui-
tively not, as the wall has the capacity to stop the window from being hit 
by any ball in all (normal) circumstances, so the fielder action’s makes no 
difference. Consequently, the fact that there is no serious possibility of 
the fielder’s ball hitting the window, and so no causal relation between 
the two, is largely grounded in facts about the wall’s capacities. Similarly, 
I would suggest, that the agent has the abilities she does grounds facts 
about what causal relations she stands in to events in the world.  
Let’s turn now, however, to a rather glaring problem clearly articu-
lated by Sartorio. If we allow that facts extrinsic to the causal relation can 
effect whether or not something is a cause, why shouldn’t we apply the 
same reasoning to a FSC? In the case of switching offered, ARR, Sarto-
rio argues that Ryder is not a cause because of some factor extrinsic to 
the causal history – namely that all roads lead to Rome. So, switching di-
rection makes no difference to the effect. Similarly, in our FSC, we might 
argue, Frank’s not deciding to kill Furt just switches the route via which 
Furt is killed – from one which doesn’t involve the triggering of the de-
vice to one that does. Either way, it makes no difference to the eventual 
outcome.  
At this juncture, Sartorio’s Difference-Making principle, presented 
as a necessary condition of causation, plays a crucial role: 
 
Difference-Making (Causes) [CDM]: Causes make a difference to their ef-
fects in that the effects wouldn’t have been caused by the absence of their 
causes [p. 94]. 
 
But at first glance at least, it is unclear how CDM helps, since well-
known pre-emption cases, of which FSCs are an instance, seem to pose 
obvious counterexamples. Take, for instance, this variation of the Frank 
FSC:  
 
Similar Process FSC: Frank is deliberating whether or not to kill 
Furt. Unbeknownst to him, there is an internal device situated in 
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his brain. If Frank decides not to kill Furt at t (or if he just hasn’t 
made up his mind yet by t), then the device will be triggered. Once 
triggered, the device would recreate the very sequence that would 
have occurred in Frank had he made the decision to kill Furt. In 
light of this decision (however caused), Frank kills Furt.  
 
The problem here is clear: it seems that the effect, the death of Furt, will 
occur in the same way (excepting the trigger) given the cause and the ab-
sence of the cause, since the absence of the cause will trigger the device, 
which will recreate the same causal process that would have been trig-
gered by Frank’s deciding to kill Furt. So, in this case, it seems that the 
effect would have been caused by the absence of its cause, contrary to 
CDM. We can back up this claim by arguing that there is a relation of 
counterfactual dependence between Frank’s not deciding to kill Furt and 
the device’s causing Frank to kill Furt, since this is precisely what triggers 
the device.  
One reply offered by Sartorio is to say that there is still some differ-
ence in the way that the cause comes about, given the absence, versus 
the presence, of the decision [pp.98-9]. And so, there is a difference in 
causal relations here. This is enough to ensure that CDM is satisfied, ac-
cording to Sartorio, since the principle only asserts that, 
 
a cause makes a difference by determining not the events that occur in the 
actual and counterfactual scenarios, but the causal relations that obtain in 
the actual and counterfactual scenarios: whether a cause occurs makes a 
difference to whether there is a causal relation linking an event or its ab-
sence (according as the event is present or absent) to the effect [p. 76]. 
 
So explicated, however, CDM risks looking trivial. Nothing interesting is 
being said about difference-making if we just claim that when C causes 
E, we have a cause C which we wouldn’t have had without C causing E. 
If C causes E, then just in virtue of C’s being a cause, it will obviously 
make a difference to the causal relations that obtain, since now we have a 
causal relation which we wouldn’t have had. Not just any difference in 
causal relations seems to be enough then. To be interesting, CDM must 
say more, something like: once the purported cause has occurred, then in 
virtue of its occurring, there must be some difference in the causal rela-
tions that obtain. But this is precisely what is in question in Similar Pro-
cess FSC.  
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A better option, which Sartorio appeals to later [p. 104], is to utilise 
another of her commitments – the intransitivity of causation. Because, 
according to Sartorio, causation is not a transitive relation, we can say 
that the triggering event is caused by Frank’s failure to make that deci-
sion at t, which causes the killing of Furt, but Frank’s failure to make 
that decision at t is not a cause of Furt’s death. So, the absence of that 
act has different causes from its presence. Now, however, we are left 
wondering why this should be a case where transitivity fails? Appealing 
to CDM is of no use to Sartorio here, because CDM can only be pre-
served by denying transitivity and we have no independent reason, i.e. 
apart from that given by CDM, that we can appeal to.  
Sartorio might reply at this point by arguing that it’s just intuitive to 
say that Frank’s failure to decide at t is not a cause of Furt’s death. So, 
we have reason to deny transitivity. This intuition can be backed up fur-
ther by the thought that by failing to decide to kill Furt at t, Frank cre-
ates a threat to the occurrence of the effect. In Yablo’s terminology 
[Yablo (2002)], this failure creates a need which is only fulfilled by the ac-
tions of the device. So, because we have a threat-cancellation scenario 
here, it is right to think that the absence of the decision in not a cause of 
the effect. 
We can vary the case a little, however, to unsettle our intuitions: 
 
Weak-Willed Frank: Frank is terribly weak-willed. If he decides to 
kill Furt at t, then this will automatically disable the device, but 
there is still a chance, given his weak-will, that he won’t kill Furt. If 
he doesn’t decide to kill Furt at t, then the device will automatically 
kick in and will ensure that he will kill Furt. Frank decides to kill 
Furt at t and carries out his plan.  
 
In this case, Frank’s deciding to kill Furt at t is arguably a cause (since we 
have the right kind of process and a step-wise counterfactual depend-
ence). But his failing to decide to kill Furt at t is also arguably a cause be-
cause then the device, which will guarantee the effect, will kick in. So, by 
not deciding, Frank thereby raises the probability of the effect, switching 
the route to a much steadier one and thereby ensuring Furt’s death. Ar-
guably, then, CDM is false and the relation is transitive because Frank’s 
not deciding makes the result more likely.  
There are, then, grounds for thinking that CDM is not a necessary 
condition of causation. Perhaps we shouldn’t take these intuitions seri-
ously, but in the absence of a more comprehensive analysis of causation 
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which justifies setting these intuitions aside, there seems no obvious rea-
son to do so. Sartorio, however, does have one more card up her sleeve. 
Drawing upon earlier work (2013), she argues that CDM is central to 
moral responsibility. She writes,  
 
it seems clear that, if a fact makes the agent deserve the expression of a 
certain reactive attitude, say, blame, the absence of that fact couldn’t also 
make the agent deserve the expression of the same attitude…it couldn’t be 
the case that a fact and its very absence would make the agent equally de-
serving of blame [Sartorio (2013), p. 206-7].  
 
Consequently, Sartorio (2016) argues, ‘if the relevant concept of cause is 
one that bears the right kinds of connections to moral responsibility, it 
must be one that satisfies Difference-Making (Causes)’ [p.96]. So, we 
might argue that because CDM is required for moral responsibility, we 
are wedded to an analysis of causation that respects it, and so we must 
find some way of dealing with contrary intuitions.  
It is not clear, however, that this is true. Take another, slight varia-
tion of the FSC case: 
 
Wiley Frank: Franks want to kill Furt but doesn’t want to be 
blamed for it. He finds out about the neuroscientist’s plan and de-
cides to use it to his advantage. So, he ensures that he doesn’t de-
cide to kill Furt at t (e.g. he puts on a gripping film to distract 
himself from such deliberations at the relevant time) and thereby 
just waits for the device to kick in. Then, if he is caught, he has the 
perfect excuse to get him off the hook.  
 
Here it seems that Frank is intending to cause Furt’s death in a deviant 
way – that the device kicks in and forces him to kill Furt is all part of his 
master plan. In this case, I think it is plausible to say that Frank is moral-
ly responsible for the death. Since Frank does seem morally responsible 
for the death if he decides or doesn’t decide (given these special circum-
stances), it’s not evident that CDM is the principle that bears the right 
connections to moral responsibility. 
But what of the intuitive thought that ‘it couldn’t be the case that a 
fact and its very absence would make the agent equally deserving of 
blame’ [Sartorio (2013), p.27]? We can reply that Frank is deserving of 
blame because of his underlying, murderous intent and it’s right to say 
that he wouldn’t have been equally deserving of blame in the absence of 
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this murderous intent. But, given the unusual set-up, Frank can choose 
to implement his murderous intent by deciding to kill or not deciding to 
kill and he decides, in this case, to do it in the latter way. Blameworthi-
ness for the original murderous intent is thus transmitted to failing to 
make that decision, as this is the means by which he has decided to carry 
out Furt’s death.  
CDM, then, is problematic. Contrary intuitions give us reason to 
doubt both that it is necessary for causation and that it is required for moral 
responsibility. This matters to Sartorio’s wider argument since she uses 
CDM to justify the claim that there is no causation in ARR, because of the 
extrinsic factor of all roads leading to Rome, but there is causation in FSCs, 
despite the extrinsic presence of the device. But if CDM is not necessary 
for causation, then ARR and FSCs are put on an equal footing – there is no 
more reason to think that the causal status of Frank’s decision is immune 
to the presence of the device than there is to think that Ryder’s hurting 
Romans is unaffected by the number of roads that lead to Rome. 
The worry, however, goes deeper than this. For even if I am wrong 
and CDM is a necessary condition of causation, it is still not clear that it 
serves to distinguish between FSCs and cases like ARR. Sartorio argues 
that it does because, in the case of Frank’s decision, we are taking away 
something which makes an important contribution to the outcome and 
changes the way the cause comes about. In contrast, in ARR we are just 
switching the route via which the Romans will be hurt. But the previous 
discussion gives us grounds for thinking that this doesn’t provide a clear, 
principled distinction between the two cases. First, in FSCs, no less than 
in ARR, we can assume that the device’s kicking in renders it inevitable 
that Furt will die. Moreover, if we switch the case to Weak-Willed Frank, 
it seems we are not taking any important contribution away from the ef-
fect, indeed, Frank is rendering it less likely by deciding to shoot Furt. 
Second, as in Similar Process FSC, we can stipulate it so that everything 
about the causal process is identical apart from the initial trigger. So, it’s 
highly questionable whether the difference the actual cause makes need be 
significantly greater in an FSC than in a case of switching. After all, in 
ARR there is still some difference made to the causal process initiated by 
Ryder’s steering his horse down one road rather than another, since the 
horse travels down a numerically different path to cause its eventual harm.  
In short, it is still unclear, given the justifications offered, why FSCs 
should be immune from extrinsic factors whilst NARR/ARR are not. Why 
does this matter? Because it means that Sartorio’s defence of (S) – the su-
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pervenience thesis – undermines her case for FSCs – which is offered as 
the sole motivation for (S). So, this is a significant issue for Sartorio.  
 
 
IV. SARTORIO’S POSITIVE PROPOSAL 
 
In chapter four Sartorio offers her positive proposal – an actual se-
quence view of basic freedom. Sartorio takes reason-sensitivity to be the 
crucial necessary condition of freedom, the basic idea being that a free 
agent is one that can respond in the appropriate way to a wide range of 
reasons. In Part One of chapter 4, she is thus keen to show why her pre-
decessors don’t get it quite right — in particular McKenna (2013) and 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998) — thereby motivating her new and improved 
account in Part Two.  
Sartorio’s reason-sensitivity analysis is unique in employing not only 
reasons, but also the absences of reasons. The key idea is that when we 
are acting freely, and responding appropriately to reasons, we are not on-
ly responding to reasons but also to their absence. So, for instance, it 
might have been the case that had Frank known that Furt had five chil-
dren, this would have prevented him from shooting Furt. So, the ab-
sence of this reason – not knowing that Furt had children or knowing 
that he had some number less than five – is a cause of his action. Sarto-
rio thus offers a new necessary condition of reason-sensitivity, incorpo-
rating the role of absences, 
 
CRS (causal reasons-sensitivity): An agent is reasons-sensitive in acting in 
a certain way when the agent acts on the basis of, perhaps in addition to 
the presence of reasons to act in the relevant way, the absence of suffi-
cient reasons to refrain from acting in that way, for an appropriately wide 
range of such reasons [p. 132]. 
 
Three key benefits are claimed for CRS: first, ‘it avoids counterfactuals al-
together’ [p. 134]. Second, because ‘CRS focuses on actual causes’ [ibid.], 
the analysis is robust enough to ground freedom. Finally, unlike Fischer 
and Ravizza’s account, it is a purely agent based account and has no need 
for mechanisms. It thus avoids the tricky issue of mechanism individuation 
which plagues Fischer and Ravizza’s analysis. In what follows, I shall raise 
a concern for each of these proposed advantages of CRS.  
The first advantage is critical to Sartorio, since she writes that her 
aim is to offer a radically different account of reason sensitivity, ‘one that 
doesn’t understand reason-sensitivity in counterfactual or modal terms, 
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but exclusively in terms of actual causal histories’ [p. 122]. However, at 
least as conceived by Sartorio, there is no sharp distinction between 
causal histories and counterfactual considerations — causal histories 
have counterfactual and modal facts at their heart. This is evident from 
the example she offers: why should we say that the absence of reason R 
(Furt’s having five children) is a cause of Frank’s action? There need be, 
recall, no property of Frank which corresponds to the absence of R, as 
Sartorio is clear that the absence of R need not enter into Frank’s con-
sciousness at all. So, we can assume that there is no mental state of 
awareness of the absence of R that enters into Biff or Oomphy relations 
in a causal chain, typical of what is sometimes known as productive cau-
sation.5 The only reason cited for thinking of it as a cause is a counter-
factual one: if he had thought of R, then he wouldn’t have killed Furt. 
Notice how similar this is to Fischer and Ravizza’s proposal:  
 
there is some possible scenario (or possible world) – with the same laws as 
the actual world – in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the 
agent recognizes that reason, and the agent does otherwise [Fischer and 
Ravizza (1998), p.63].  
 
Using Sartorio’s example, this could be glossed as: there is some possible 
world where Frank recognizes that Furt has 5 children, he recognizes 
that this is a sufficient reason not to kill Furt, and so he does not kill 
Furt. Either way, counterfactual or modal facts about what the agent 
would do in different circumstances seem at the heart of both analyses.  
This is relevant to Sartorio’s second proposed advantage of CRS. It 
is not clear that absences of reasons ‘avoids the problem of robustness’ 
[p. 134], because in the absence of an account of absences, it is not clear 
what they are. One well worked out view of omissions is that omissions 
just are possibilities [see Bernstein (2014)]. So, by talking about the ab-
sences of reasons, we are just talking about possible reasons we might 
have had. In this context, this view seems preferable to one that treats 
absences as nothing at all [Clarke (2014)], or as some positive event de-
scribed in a negative way (especially given there need be no consciousness 
of the absence of a reason – so no conscious event which could be under a 
negative description). What seems crucial in this case is that, given the ac-
tual psychological state of Frank, in a not too distant possible world, it is 
possible that the thought of R occur to Frank, and this would have then 
caused him not to kill Furt. This counterfactual explanation of what is 
Causation and the Grounds for Freedom                                                       73 
teorema XXXVII/1, 2018, pp. 61-76 
going on seems more basic than one that appeals to the absences of rea-
sons, since we explain the absence of reasons in terms of it.  
In light of this, one might reasonably think that the counterfactual 
facts are better placed to account for facts about our freedom than those 
concerning absences of reasons, since the counterfactual facts make true 
or ground the facts about absences of reasons. Both, I would suggest 
however, should only be viewed as important to reasons-sensitive ac-
counts insofar as they help illuminate the key abilities an agent is re-
quired to have on this view. Sartorio criticises McKenna for tying a 
reasons-sensitivity account to an analysis of dispositions, arguing that it 
would be safer to find some alternative [p. 118]. But since reasons-
sensitivity accounts are in the business of explaining how it is that we are 
able to respond to reasons differently, it seems that we should be trying 
to work out what the right analysis of these abilities are.  
Finally, what of the claim that CRS avoids the tricky issue of mech-
anism individuation, since it is a purely agent-based account? At this 
point, the argument is unclear. Any standard FSC creates a problem for 
CRS, as Sartorio discusses, since given the presence of the device, we do 
not have any relation of counterfactual dependence to justify the claim that 
the absence of R really was a cause. If we add the presence of the device, 
then Frank would not have responded to R and so it seems that not-R 
isn’t a cause of killing Furt. Consequently, CRS isn’t satisfied and so Frank 
is not free.  
Sartorio responds to this problem by utilising the previously dis-
cussed Difference-Making principle (III). The idea is that in an FSC, the 
absence of R is still a cause since, ‘intuitively, the absence of R does not 
make a contribution to Frank’s choice that R itself would not have made if 
R had obtained.’ [p. 131]. But now assume that in this FSC, the device is 
internally lodged in Frank, in one sense part of him, something akin to a 
blockage like a tumour [see Pereboom (2001), pp. 27-8]. Leaving aside 
aforementioned problems, CDM requires us to consider what different 
contribution the absence of R would have played in the act’s causal history. 
And here is the natural reply one might give: consider Frank’s deliberation 
process at t, if R had been present, then Frank would not have decided to 
kill Furt via that deliberation process (the device would have to have kicked 
in instead, or the deliberation process would have been blocked by the tu-
mour, etc.) and so not-R makes a difference to the causal history. But note 
this explanation appeals to a mechanism – Frank’s deliberation process – 
linking Frank to his action. If we remove this, and just appeal to the 
agent as a whole, this explanation of the difference in the contribution of 
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not-R versus R does not seem to work. So now we have: consider Frank 
and his reasons, including not-R, at t. If R had been present, then Frank 
would still have decided to kill Furt and so not-R doesn’t make a differ-
ence to the causal history.  
The point here is that it is not clear how we get a difference in the 
causal history of the contributions of R and not-R, unless we home in on 
something more fine-grained that the agent himself – something like a 
process that leads up to the decision. For only then can we duplicate that 
mechanism and consider whether, given different reasons (i.e. R instead of 
not-R) he would have responded differently. Once the device/tumour has 
been embedded within the agent, the agent considered as a whole seems 
entirely unresponsive to reasons – absences and all. We need to do some 
fancy footwork to avoid this conclusion, and talk of R and not-R making 
different contributions to Frank’s decision just seems to be a way of inad-
vertently slipping mechanisms or processes back into a theory of freedom.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Sartorio’s book offers a rich and detailed defence of an actual-
sequence view of freedom. In doing so, she attempts to provide the basis 
of a compatibilist analysis of freedom and moral responsibility. Since only 
a necessary condition is offered, Sartorio’s analysis doesn’t exclude the 
possibility that necessary and sufficient conditions of freedom will have to 
add indeterminism into the mix. But her discussion of incompatibilist 
source arguments (chapter 5) provides some reason to hope that it won’t.  
Sartorio’s focus on causation and how it relates to freedom is illumi-
nating and clearly worth pursuing. I am sceptical, however, that there is a 
clear divide between issues surrounding causation and those of pow-
ers/abilities, and so I think the debate is skewed somewhat by thinking of 
these as rivals. Given that powers and causation are so intimately bound 
together, a strategy which views all three in tandem – powers/abilities, 
causation and freedom – may yet prove even more fruitful.6 
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NOTES 
 
1 See, for example Vihvelin’s view [Vihvelin (2013), p. 187], where the abil-
ities which are relevant to freedom are largely grounded in the intrinsic proper-
ties of agents. Other dispositional compatibilists, such as Fara (2008), also share 
this view. 
2 This won’t always be the case. There could be some change to the 
agent’s abilities without a change to their intrinsic properties, so the relation is 
not one of supervenience. For instance, an agent may go from being not vulner-
able to vulnerable because of some extrinsic threat. But even in such cases, we 
can still see the agent’s vulnerability as a local property of the actual sequence, 
so Sartorio’s claim that the AP ‘assigns a central role to certain kinds of facts 
that are not typically thought to pertain to actual sequences’ is unjustified. In 
this, it is like Sartorio’s cause-makers: those extrinsic factors that need to be in 
place for some event to count as a cause (see III and the examples of ARR and 
NARR). That these extrinsic cause-makers are required does not, according to 
Sartorio, undermine (S) or (N), since those causes are still part of the actual 
causal sequence and we are entitled to include ‘the grounds of actual sequences’ 
[p. 18] in our supervenience base. Similarly, then, the agent’s vulnerability can be 
seen as a feature of the actual causal sequence, even if one of its truthmakers is 
extrinsic to that sequence.  
3 In the causation literature, examples such as ARR are often referred to as 
‘switching cases’ [see Sartorio (2016) p. 72]. I shall follow Sartorio in adopting 
this usage. Key to the structure of these examples is that although the causal 
route via which the outcome is brought about is altered or switched by some in-
tervention, the effect will occur whichever route is taken.  
4 See, for instance, Halpern and Pearl (2005). 
5 See Hall (2002) for an analysis of two concepts of causation – productive 
and counterfactual. Sartorio makes it clear that she is not interested in a kind of 
causation which excludes omissions and is intrinsic (see chapter 2 §1), and so 
she rules out this productive relation.  
6 Many thanks to Jon Bebb, Helen Beebee, Ángel García Rodríguez, Caro-
lina Sartorio and Joel Smith.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
BERNSTEIN, S. (2014), ‘Omissions as Possibilities’; Philosophical Studies, 167, pp. 1-23. 
CLARKE, R. (2014), Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics and Responsibility; Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
HALPERN J. Y. and PEARL, J. (2005), ‘Causes and Explanations: A Structural-
Model Approach. Part I: Causes’; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 
56, pp. 843-887. 
FARA, M. (2008), ‘Masked Abilities and Compatibilism’; Mind, 117, pp. 843-865. 
76                                                                                            Ann Whittle 
teorema XXXVII/1, 2018, pp. 61-76 
FISCHER, J. M. and RAVIZZA, M. (1998), Responsibility and Control; Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  
FRANKFURT, H. (1969), ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’; Journal 
of Philosophy, 66, pp. 829-39. 
HALL, N. (2002), ‘Two Concepts of Causation’. In Collins, J., Hall, E. and Paul, 
L. (eds.) Causation and Counterfactuals. pp. 225-76, Cambridge, Mass., The 
MIT Press.  
MCDERMOTT, M. (1995), ‘Redundant Causation’; British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 46, pp. 523-44. 
MCKENNA, M. (2013), ‘Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms’. In 
Shoemaker, D. (ed.) Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Vol. 1 pp. 
151-83, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
PEREBOOM, D. (2001), Living Without Free Will; Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
SARTORIO, C. (2005), ‘Causes as Difference-Makers’; Philosophical Studies, 123, 
pp. 71-96. 
–– (2013), ‘Making a Difference in a Deterministic World’; Philosophical Review, 
122, pp. 189-214. 
–– (2016), Causation and Free Will; Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
VIHVELIN, K. (2013), Causes, Laws and Free Will; Oxford, Oxford University 
Press.  
WHITTLE, A. (forthcoming), ‘Responsibility in Context’; Erkenntnis. 
YABLO, S. (2002), ‘De Facto Dependence’; Journal of Philosophy, 99, pp. 130-48. 
 
